College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Appellate Briefs

Faculty and Deans

2004

Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law; AARP; The American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation; The Legal Aid Society –
Employment Law Center; The National Asian
Pacific American Legal Consortium; The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
People; The National Employment Lawyers
Association; The National Partnership for Women
and Families; The National Women's Law Center;
and Now Legal Defense and Education Fund; as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
Susan Grover
William & Mary Law School, ssgrov@wm.edu

Patricia E. Roberts
William & Mary Law School, perobe@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Grover, Susan; Roberts, Patricia E.; Arnwine, Barbara R.; Henderson, Thomas J.; Foreman, Michael L.; Crawford, Sarah R.; and
Wiggins, Audrey, "Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; AARP; The American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation; The Legal Aid Society – Employment Law Center; The National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium; The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People; The National Employment Lawyers Association; The National Partnership for
Women and Families; The National Women's Law Center; and Now Legal Defense and Education Fund; as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent" (2004). Appellate Briefs. 2.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/briefs/2

Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/briefs

Barbara R. Arnwine
Thomas J. Henderson
Michael L. Foreman
See next page for additional authors

Authors

Susan Grover, Patricia E. Roberts, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Michael L. Foreman, Sarah R.
Crawford, and Audrey Wiggins

This brief is available at William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/briefs/2

No. 03-95
IN THE

§uprrmr illourt of tqr lllnttr!l §tatrs
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,
Petitioner,

v.
NANCY DREW SUDERS,
--------~Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRlEF FOR THE LA WYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW; AARP; THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION; THE LEGAL AID
SOCIETY- EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER; THE
NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL
CONSORTIUM; THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE; THE
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION;
THE NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND
FAMILIES; THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER;
AND NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND;
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
SUSAN GROVER*
PROFESSOR OF LAW
DIRECTOR OF EQUAL OPPORT'Y
PATRICIA ROBERTS
ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF LAW
ASSISTANT DEAN FOR
ACADEMIC PROGRAMS
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
P.O. Box 8795

BARBARA R. ARNWINE
THOMAS J. HENDERSON
MICHAEL L. FOREMAN
SARAH C. CRAWFORD
AUDREY WIGGINS
THE LAWYERS ' COMMIITEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW

1401 New York Ave., NW
Suite 400
Williamsburg, VA 23185
(757) 221-4000
Washington, DC 20005
* Counsel of Record
(202) 662-8600
(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)

DANIEL B. KOHRMAN
LAURIE A. MCCANN
THOMA'S OSBORNE
AARP FOUNDATION
LITIGATION
MELVIN RADOWHZ

AARP

601 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20049
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO
LENORA M. LAPIDUS
JENNiFER ARNETI
AMERICAN ClVIL
LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION

125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
PATRICIA A. SHIU
CLAUDIA CENTER
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETYEMPLOYMENT LAW
CENTER
600 HARRISON STREET

SUITE 120
SAN FRANCISCO, CA

94107
DENNIS C. HAYES
GENERAL COUNSEL
1ANETIE WIPPER
ASSISTANT GENERAL
COUNSEL
NAACPNATIONAL
HEADQUARTERS
4805 Mt. Hope Drive
Baltimore, MD 21215

VINCENT A. ENG
NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC
AMERICAN LEGAL
CONSORTIUM

1140 Connecticut Ave.,
N.W. - Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
ANGELA DALFEN
NA1'10NAL EMPLOYMENT
LA WYERS ASSOCIATION

44 Montgomery Street
Suite 2080
San Francisco, CA 94104
JUDITH L. LICHTMAN
JOCELYN C. FRYE
QUYENL TA
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES

1875 Connecticut Ave., NW
Smite 650
Washington D.C. 20009
JOCELYN SAMUELS
DINAR. LASSOW
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER
11 Dupont Circle, NW

Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
JENNifER K.. BROWN
NOWLEGALDEFENSE
ANDEDUCATION:&JND

395 Hudson Street
New York. NY 10014

Counsel for Amici Curiae

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a constructive discharge that is caused by a
supervisor's sexual harassment is a tangible
employment action?

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .. .. ... . .... .. ... ....... .. .. . . .. .. . . . ... i
T ABLE OF CONTENTS ... . . . .. .... . ..... .. ..... . ....... . ... . .... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... .... ... . . .. . . .. . .. .. . . .. .. . . ...... iii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST ...... . . . . . . .. ...... . . . . . . ... ..... . 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ... . . .... .. ... .. .... ..... .......... 8
ARGUMENT . . .. .......... ..... .. .. .. . ....... . . . . .. .. ......... . ... ll

I.

When Proven , a Constructi ve D isc harge is the
Legal Equivalent of an Act ual D isc harge.
Whi ch Faragher/Ellerth Defined as a Tan gibl e
E mpl oym ent Actio n .. . ........... . ... ....... . .. ... ...... 11

II.

When Proven , Constructive Di scharge Add resses
th e Co re Po licy Co nside rat io ns Underlyin g the
Faragher/Ellerth Defense, and Permitti ng th e
Defen se in a Co nstructive Di sc harge Situation
Makes No Sense ......... . ...... . . ..... .. .. ........... .... ... 17

ill.

Co nstructive Di sc harge Ex hibits th e Attributes
of a Tangibl e Emp loyment Action ........ ...... .. ..... 20

CONCLUS IO N . . . ..... . ... .. .. .... . . .. ........ . ............ .. . ... 25

Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Alberter v. McDonald 's Corp.,
70 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. 1999) .. ... ............. ...... .... ..... 12
Aminnokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
60F.3d 1126(4thCir.1995) ...... .... ........... ... ........ ............ 16
Bevilacqua v. Cubby Bear, Ltd., No . 98 C 7568,
2000 WL 1521 35 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2000) ........ .... .. ... ....... 11
Brown v. Amerizech Corp., 128 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1997) ... 15
Burlington Indu stries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998) ............... ............ ......... ... ....... .... passim
Califomia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S . 272 (1987) ............................................. ... .. ........ .. 5
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,
191 F. 3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999) ......................... ...... ........ ...... 12
Ca rtwright Hardware Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
600 F.2d 268 (lOth Cir. 1979) .......................... ................ 16
Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160
(N.D. Iowa 2000) ......... ............. ... .... ........................... 11 , 22
Clarkv. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .... ............. 16
Delazaro v. Lehigh Univ., No. 98-CV432,
1999 U.S. Di st. LEXIS 1214 FEP Cases 256
(E.D. Pa . Jan . 29, 1999) ...... ... .. ... ............ .......... ...... .. .. ... ... 12
Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 (lOth Cir. 1986) ....... . 14
Desert Palace v. Cosra , 539 U.S. 90 (2003) .................. 3, 4, 6
Desmarteau v. Ciry of Wichita, Kan.,
64 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Kan. 1999) ....... .. ........................ 12
Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, Kan. Water Dep 'r,
77 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D . Kan. 1999) ... ..... ..... .. ................. 12
Durham Lzfe Ins. Co. v. Evans,
166 F.3d 139 (3 d Cir. 1999) ... .. ........................ ........... ..... 11
Edelrnan v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002) .... ....... 6
EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hospitals,
276 F. 3d 326 (7th Cir. 2002) ..................... ... ... ........ ........ . 14
English v. Powell 592 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1979) .... ... .. ........ .. 14

IV

Fa ragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) pass im
Fitzgerald v. H enderson , 25 1 F.3d 345 (2d Ci r. 200 1) ... ..... 14
Galloway v. Matago rda County, Tex.,
35 F. Supp. 2d 952 (S.D. Tex . 1999) ...... ..... .... ....... ......... . 12
Goldrneier v. A llstate Ins. Co.,
337 F.3 d 629 (6th Cir. 200 3) ... ..... ... ....... ... ...... ........... 14 , 15
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 ( 1993) ... .... .. ..5, 7, 16
Holly D . v. Califomia Institute of Technology,
339 F.3d 11 58 (9t h Cir. 2003) ............ .. ... .............. ......... ..20
In Matzer of Sterling Corser Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938) .... 14
International Un ion, UA W v. Johnson Comrols,
499 U.S. 187 (1 99 1) ...... ...... ...... ................... ....... ..... ........... 5
Jaros v. LodgeNer Entm 't Corp.,
294 F. 3d 960 (8th Cir. 200:2) ........... ...... .......... ..... ........... . 11
l in v. Metropolitan LLfe Ins. Co ..
310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002) .. ... ......... .. ........ .. ... ...... .... ........ 20
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co ..
646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981) .... ..... ...... ......... .. ... ......... .... 14
Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp. ,
20 F. S up p. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998) .... ............. .... .......... . 12
Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368 (9t h Cir. 1988) .... ....... ....... 14
Kirsch v. Fleet Streer, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 1998) .. .. 15
Kols rad v. American Dental Association,
527 U.S. 526 (1999) .... .... ...... .. .. ... ... .. ....... .. ............ .. .... ...... .4
Landg rafv. US! Fi/111 Prods. ,
968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992) ..... ... ....... .. .. ............ ..... .. 14 , 15
Leslie v. Un ited Tech. Co rp ..
51 F. S upp. 2d 1332 (S.D . Fla. 1998) ................. .... ..... .... . 12
Lintz v. A m . Gen. Fin., Inc ..
50 F. S upp. 2d 1074 (D. Kan . 1999) ...... .. ..... ......... ....... .... 11
Mana tl v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792 (9 th Cir. 2003) .. 15
Meriror Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 ( 1986) ...... .. .. .. ...... ....... ... ..... .. ... ........ .. .. 5, 10, 20
M iller v. D.F. Zee's, Inc.,
31 F. S upp. 2d 792 CD . Or. 1998) ............ .... ...... ............... 12
Na tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 1 (2001) .... ... .... ... .............. ................. ....... .. .... ...... 3

v

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. ,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) ... ..... .. ..... .... .. .. ... ... .. .... ........ ............... .... 7
Paroline v. Unisys Corp. , 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) ...... .. 14
Pollard v. E.!. Dupont Nemours Co. , 532 U.S . 843 (2001) .. .4
Powell v. Morris , 37 F. Supp. 2d lOll (S.D. Ohi o 1999) .... 12
Price v. Delaware Dep 't of Corrections,
40 F. Supp. 2d 544 (D. Del. 1999) ... ..... ...... ......... ... .......... 11
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) ... ....... ... .5
Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333
F.3d 27 (l st Cir. 2003) ....... .... .. ..... ...... ......... ...... ... .. .. ...... .. 11
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. ,
530 U.S. 133 (2000) .......... .... ... .... .... .. ...... .... .. ... ... ........... 3, 4
Reynolds v. Golden Corral C01p.,
106 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Ala. 1999), aff'd
213 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ...... ... .. ........ 12
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) .. ......... .. ......... ... ... .... .. .7
Robinson v. Sappington , 351 F. 3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003) ... .... 11
Rousselle v. GTE Directories Corp. ,
85 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ..... .... .. ..... ... .... ....... 11
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) .. 13
Scott v. Ameritex Yam , 72 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.S.C. 1999) .. 12
Sheridan v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours and Co. ,
100 F. 3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) ..... ..... .... ... ... .. ... ... ..... ....... .. . 14
Suders v. Easton, 325 F. 3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003) ... ... ..... . passim
Sure-Tan , Inc. v. NLRB , 467 U.S . 883 (1984) .. ... .......... ..... . 13
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema , 534 U.S. 506 (2001) ... ...... ..... ......... 3
Th e Coachman's Inn, 147 NLRB 278 (1964) ... ... .. .... .. ........ 14
U.S. Airways, In c. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) .... .. ... ...... 5
U.S. v. Virginia , 518 U.S. 515 (1996) .. ..... .. ... ... .. ... ....... ..... .. .. 5
United Stares v. Diebold, In c., 369 U.S. 654 (1962) ......... ..... 8
Vasquez v. Atrium Door and Window Co. of Ariz., Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Ariz . 2002) .. .. ........ ... .... ... .... .... 22
Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd.,
3 F. 3d 476 (l st Cir. 1993) ... ... ... .... ..... ....... ......... ......... ..... . 14
Watson v. Nationwide In s. Co ..
823 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1987) ... .. .... ... ... ...... ... ... ... ...... .... ... 14

Vl

West v. Gibson , 527 U.S. 212 ( 1999) ... ..... ... .. ... .... .......... ... .... 6
West v. Marion Merrell Dmv, In c. ,
54 F. 3d 493 (8 th Ci r. 1995) ..... .... .... ... .... ..... .... ... ... .. ... ...... 16
STAT UTES
National Labor Re lati ons Act , 29 U.S .C. 15 1 et seq .. ... .. ..... l 3
T itle VII of th e Civil Ri ghts Ac t of 1964 ,
42 U.S.C. 2000e er seq .. .......... ........ ..... ..... .... ........... . passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
110 CO NG . REC. 3086, 72 10- 11,84 53 (1964) ... ..... ...... ..... 14
A. L arson & L. Larson,
Empl oyment Di scrimjn ati on (1987) . ...... .. ..... ... .... .. ....... ... 14
Amended Memorandum in Support of E EOC's Oppositi o n
to M otion fo r Summ ary J udgment at 15-19 , EEOC v.
Barton Prorective Services, In c., 47 F. Supp . 2d 57
(D.D .C. 1999) (No. 98- l 536/JR) ........ ... .... .... .... ...... ......... 12
B1ief for EE OC at 3, EEOC v. Crowde r Constru ction Co.,
No. 3:00CV 186-V, 200 1 WL 1750 843
W .D .N.C. Oc t. 26, 2001 ) ... ..... ......... ...... ...... ........ .. ..... ...... 12
Bri ef forPetiti oner ... .. ...... .. ... ... ........ ...... .......... .. 10, 17 , 19 , 22
Bri ef for Solic itor Genera l .... ... ... .. ............. .. ...... .... .. 19 , 20 , 23
EEO C Interpreti ve Manu al .. ... ....... .. ........... ....... ...... ...... ...... 14
S usan G rover, After E llerth: The Tangible Employm ent
Action in Sexual Harassmenr Analysis, 35 U. M ICH . J.L.
REFORM 809, 839 (2002 ) ...... ... ... ........ ... ..... ...... ... ... ......... . 2 1

No. 03-95
IN THE

§uprrmr arnurt nf f4r lllnifro §tafrs
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,
Petitioner,

v.
NANCY DREW SUDERS,
_ _ __ __ _ __ _ ,R espondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE LA WYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW; AARP; THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION; THE LEGAL AID
SOCIETY- EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER; THE
NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL
CONSORTIUM; THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE; THE
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION;
THE NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND
FAMILIES; THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER;
AND NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND;
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The fo ll owing amici submit thi s brief, wi th the
1
consent of the parties, in support of Respondent 's argument
th at th e Third Circuit properl y held th at a co nstru cti ve

1

Petiti oner and Respondent fi led a j oint consent to the fi ling of amici
briefs with the Clerk of thi s CourL Counsel for amicus curiae authored
thi s brief in its entirety. No person or entity, other than the amicus
curiae, its members, or its coun sel, made a monetary contributi on to the
preparati on or submi ssio n of the bri ef.
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di scharge is a tangible emp loyment ac ti on. Suders v. Easton,
325 F.3d 432 (3d C ir. 2003).
Thi s case , in volvin g the questi on of w heth er a
constructive
discharge
caused
by
a
s upervi sor 's
di scrimin ation is a tangible employment action, is a m atter of
signifi cant concern to the Lawye rs' Committee fo r Civil
R ights Un de r Law and the organi zati ons j oi nin g thi s amici
brief.
Thi s case co uld determin e whether the longestab lished doc trine of constructi ve di sc harge will
effec tive ly pro tect vic ti ms of harassm ent under Title VII of
?
the C ivil Ri ghts Act of 1964 , 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. - T he
Court's dec ision here will directly affec t th e rights of
e mpl oyees w ho are fo rced out of empl oyment on th e basis of
race, sex, reli gion, nat ional origin , or ethni city. As such, thi s
case directly impac ts th e constituencies served by the
un dersig ned organi zations.
T he Lawyers' Comm ittee for C ivil Ri ghts Under Law
("Lawye rs ' Committee ") is a tax-exempt, nonprofit civil
ri ghts o rgani zati on that was fo un ded in 1963 by the leaders
o f th e A merican bar, at the request of Preside nt John F.
Kennedy, in order to help defe nd the civil 1ights of
min o ri ties and th e poor. Its Board of T rustees present ly

2

S o me am ici also serve constitue nc ies tha t will be affec ted by the
Co urt ' s dec isio n because T itle VII is the mode l fo r other e mpl oyme nt
d iscrimina tio n statutes. See, e. g., Lorilla rd \'. Pons. 4 34 U .S. 575, 584
("th e pro hi biti ons o f th e [Age Di scriminati o n in E mp loy me nt Act] were
derived in haec verba fro m T itle V II") ; see a lso, e. g., Acrey v. American
Sheep Indu s. Ass'n, 9 8 1 F. 2d 1569 , 1574-75 (10 th Cir. 1992) (affi rm ing
construc tive di scharge verdi ct for pl ain tiff under ADEA, a nd app lying
same lega l ana lysis to Title VII and AD EA constructive d isc harge
c la ims).

3

inc ludes several past Presidents of the American Bar
Association , past Attorneys General of the United States, law
school deans and professors, and many of the nation 's
leading lawyers. The Lawyers' Committee, through its
Employment Discrimination Project, has been continually
involved in cases before the Court involving the proper
scope and coverage afforded to federal civil rights laws
The Lawyers'
prohibiting employment di scrimination .
Committee has handled cases involving both racial and
sex ual harassment , including filing an amicus brief in
Faragher v. Ciry of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998) .
Pursuant to a continuing interest in the approp1iate scope of
Title VII, and most recently, the Lawyers' Committee filed
briefs in Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2001); National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 1 (2001);
and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, In c. , 530 U.S.
133 (2000).
AARP is a nonparti san, nonprofit membership
organization serving over thirty-five million persons age 50
and older that is dedicated to addressing th e needs and
interests of older Americans. One of AARP's primary
objectives is to achieve dignity and equality in the workplace
through positive attitudes , practices , and policies towards
work and retirement. Almost half of AARP members are
employed, and all of these have a strong interest in the
outcome of this case , which will affect their rights under the
Age Di scrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) , due to
simil ariti es in judicial interpretation of co mparabl e
provisions of th e ADEA and Title VII. In addition, more
than half of AARP's working members are women , and a
disproportionate share of them (and of AARP members of
co lor, including African-American and Hi spanic members)
wo rk fu ll - or part-time. Thus , AARP members have a stron g
interest in vigorous enforcement of Title VII with rega rd to
sex ual (and rac ia l) harassment.
Finally, many AARP

4

members have disabilities , and rely on federal laws including
the Am eri cans with Disabilities Ac t - whose employment
di scriminati on provisions also are based on Title VII - to
create workplaces free from di scrimin atory harass ment.
The Ameri can C ivil Liberties Union ("ACLU ") is a
nationwide, nonprofit, non -parti san organi zation of more
th an 400,000 members dedicated to the principles of li bert y
and equalit y embodied in the Constitution and thi s nation 's
civil ri ghts laws. The ACLU Women 's Ri ghts Project
("WRP"), founded in 1972 by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, has
been a leader in the effo rts to elimin ate barriers to women' s
full eq ualit y in American society. As part of th at work, the
ACLU WRP has dedicated its eff01t s to ensurin g wo men 's
eq ua l treatment in th e workplace throu gh the vigorous
enforcem ent of the protections of Title VII. The ACLU has
appeared before th e Court in numero us cases involving the
proper interpretation of c ivil ri ghts laws and has fought to
ensure that all indi viduals, regardless of race , gender, or
other protected characteri stics, have equ al opportuniti es in
the workpl ace. The ACLU has pmti cipated as amicus before
the Court in several cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, inc ludin g Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524
U.S. 775 (1998). More recent Title V II cases in w hi ch the
ACLU has appeared as amicus inc lude Desert Palace v.
Costa , 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Pollard v. E. !. Dupont Nemou rs
Co. , 532 U.S. 843 (200 1); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products. In c., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); and Kolstad v.
American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
The Legal Ai d Society - Employ ment Law Center
("LAS -ELC") is a non-profit public interest law firm w hose
mi ssion is to protect, preserve, and advance the workpl ace
rights of individual s from traditionally under-represented
communiti es. Since 1970, the LAS-ELC has represented
plaintiffs in cases invo lvi ng the ri ghts of emp loyees in the
workp lace, parti cularly th ose cases of special import to

5

communities of color, women, recent immigrants ,
individual s with di sabilities , and the working poor, and
specializes in , among other areas of the law, sex
discrimi nation and sexual harassment.
The LAS-ELC has appeared before thi s Court on
numerous occasions both as counsel for plaintiffs, see
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002) ; U.S. Airways, In c. v. Bametl, 535 U.S. 391 (2002);
and Califomia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra , 479
U.S . 272 (1987) (counsel for real party in interest), as well as
in an amicus curiae capacity. See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia , 5 18
U.S. 515 (1996) ; Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17
( 1993); International Union, VA W v. Johnson Controls, 499
U.S. 187 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S . 228
(1989); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) .
The LAS-ELC' s interest in preserving the protection s
afforded employees by thi s country's antidiscrimination laws
is longstanding.
The National Association for the Advancement of
Co lored People ("NAACP") , establi shed in 1909, is the
nation 's oldest ci vii ri ghts organization. The fundamental
mi ssion of the NAACP is the advancement and improvement
of the political , educational, social, and economic status of
minorit y groups; the eli mination of prejudice ; the publicizin g
of adverse effects of di sc rimination ; and the initiation of
lawful action to sec ure the elimi nation of age , rac ial ,
religi o us, and ethnic bias .
The National Asian Pacific American Legal
Co nsortium ("NAPALC") is a national non-profit, non partisan organization whose mi ssion is to advance the legal
an d civil rights of Asian Pacific Americans. Col lectively,
NAPALC and its Affiliates the Asian Law Caucus and th e
Asian Pacifi c American Legal Center of Southern California
have over 50 years of expe ri ence in providing lega l, public

6

policy,
advocacy,
and
community
education
on
discrimination Issues. NAPALC and its Affiliates have a
long-standing commitment in addressing matters of
discrimination that have an impact on the Asian Pacific
American co mmunity, and this interest has resulted in
NAPALC's participation in a number of amicus briefs before
the courts.
The National Employment Lawyers Association
("NELA") is the country's on ly professional membership
organization of lawyers who regularly represent employees
in labor, employment and civi l rights disputes. NELA and
its 67 state and local affi liates have a membership of over
3,000 attorneys, and NELA regularly supports precedentsetting litigation affecting the rights of individuals in the
workplace. NELA has fi led amicus curiae briefs before this
Court and numerous courts of appeals regarding the proper
interpretation and application of Title VII in order to
guarantee that the rights of workers are full y protected. For
example, NELA fi led amicus curiae briefs with this Court in
Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Edelman v.
Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002) ; and West v.
Gibson, 527 U.S. 2 12 (1999).
NELA members represe nt thousands of individuals in
this country who are victims of unlawful sex discrimination ,
including sex ual harassment. The interest of NELA in this
case is to protect the rights of its members' clients, by
ensuring that the goals of Title VII of the Civil Ri ghts Act of
1964, as amended, to eradicate employment discrimination
are fully realized.
The National Partnership for Women & Families
("National Partnership") is a national advocacy organization
that develops and promotes policies to help women achieve
equal opportunity, quality health care, and economic security
for themselves and their families. Since its foundin g in
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1971 , the National Partnership (formerly the Women's Legal
Defense Fund) has worked to advance equal employment
opportunities by monitoring agencies' EEO enforcement,
challenging employment discrimination in the courts , and
leading efforts to promote employment policies such as th e
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Pregnancy
Di scrimination Act.
The National Women 's Law Center ("NWLC") is a
non-profit legal advocacy organization dedicated to th e
advancement and protection of women's ri ghts and the
corresponding elimination of sex discriminati on from all
facets of American life. Since 1972, NWLC has worked to
secure equal opportunity in the workplace, including through
the fuJI enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Ac t of
1964, as amended. NWLC has prepared or participated in
several amicus briefs in Title VII cases, including Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) , and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund is a leading
national non -profit civil rights organization that for over
thirty years has used the power of the Jaw to define and
defend women's ri ghts . A major goal of NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund is the eliminat ion of barriers
that deny women economic opportunity, such as sexual
harassment. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund has
litigated cases to secure full enforcement of Jaws prohibiting
sex ual harassment, including Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipya rds, Inc. , 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M .D. Fla. 199 1), and has
fil ed briefs in this Court as amicus curi ae on leading sex ual
harassment cases, including Burlington Industries, In c. v.
Ellerth , 524 U.S . 742 ( 1998), Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) , and Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). NOW Legal Defense and
Ed ucation Fund believes that employers must be liabl e when
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supervisors engage in di sctiminatory harass ment that results
in constructive discharge. Accordingly, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund stron gly supports affirming the decision
of the Third Circuit below.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Thi s is a constructive di sc harge case. Nancy Suders
did not choose to leave her job . She was forced to resign
because a combination of workplace conditions gave her no
other choice. 3 Suc h forced resignation is the hallmark of
con structiv e di sc harge. Thi s Court and al l of the federal
circuit courts of appeals have recognized constructive
di sc harge claim s, holdin g empl oyers liable for wrongfu l
di scharge when intolerabl e wo rk condition s force an
4
employee to resign.
In Suders' case, harassment by her
direct supervi sors 5 laid the gro und work for conditions that
ultimately became so unbearabl e th at she resigned to escape
th em. Other factors that pl aced her in thi s impossible
situat ion included the ineffec ti ve ness of procedures that
should have rem edied th e harass ment, along with events and
conditions that contributed to Suders' reasonable belief that
further efforts to resolve th e matter internall y would be
futi le.
In Faragher v. Cirv of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
3

All reasonable infe re nces must be draw n in favo r of Suders, the part y
Burlington Indus. v.
o pposing the moti o n for summary JUd g me nt.
Ellerr!t . 524 U.S. 742. 747 ( 1998). ciTin g UniTed Sta les 1·. Diebold, In c ..
369 U.S. 654. 655 ( 1962). At thi s stage in the proceedi ngs. Suders'
testimo ny that she had no cho ice in thi s matte r mu st be ta ken as true.
U ltima te ly. thi s question wo uld be put to the fact-finder.
4
See infra arg ument I.
5
Because the Court granted certiorari o n the questio n of a constructive
di sc harge caused by supe rvisors' ac tio ns, rather th an coworkers' actions,
and beca use the fac ts of thi s case in vo lve s upervisor harass ment, thi s
bri e f does no t add ress the iss ue of a constructive di sc harge ca used by
coworker harassment.
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(1998) , and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998) , thi s Co urt crafted a methodology for deciding
harass ment cases. That methodology di stinguishes between
( 1) hostil e work environment cases with no tan gible
empl oyme nt action, in which defendants may in voke an
affirmati ve defense, and (2) tangible employment action
Under
cases, m whi ch no defense IS available.
Faragher!Ellerth, employers are strictly liable if a
supervisor's harassment of a subordinate culminates in a
tangible emplo yment action. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807;
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The Court described "tangible
empl oyment action" as a "significant change in employment
status" and provided a non-ex hausti ve li st of examples, "such
as hirin g, firing , failing to promote, reassignment with
significantl y different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a signifi cant change in benefits. " Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790 ,
808 ; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62 .
Because courts have for decades recognized that a
constructi ve
di sc harge-w hen
proven-i s the
legal
equivalent
of an
ac tu al di scharge,
and because
Faragher/Ellerth defined "tangible employment actions" to
include di scharges, constructive di scharges necessaril y
constitute tangible employment actions . As a tan gible
employment action , constructive discharge precludes
in voki ng the affirmative defense that Faragher/Ellerth made
avail able in hostile environment cases. Thi s co nc lusion is
req uired by the Faragher/Ellerth description of tan gi ble
empl oyment ac tion as "a signi ficant change in employment
status, " with all th at change entai ls. The conclusion is
rendered inescapable by the reali ty that proof of th e facts
underlyin g a successfu l constructive di scharge claim, as a
practical matter, di sproves the facts that would necessaril y
underli e the affirmative defense.
The State Poli ce and its amici ignore the doctrine o f
constructi ve di sc harge that is at the core of th is case . In th eir
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view , the fact that Suders was forced to leave her job
because of her supervi sors' actions should not even facror
into the li ability equation. Describing what happened to
Suders as "mere" hostile work environment harassment,
Petitioner asks the Court to absolve the employer of
responsibility for "[t]he fact that an employee feels
compelled to quit hi s or her job in respon se to intolerable
sex ual harass ment." Brief for Petitioner at 12. From thi s
truncated analysis of the facts, Petitioner then argues that it
should be permitted to in voke th e Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense . Petitioner's disaggregation of the facts
directly contravenes the Court's mandate to co nsider the
totality of circumstances in harass ment cases. M eritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
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ARGUMENT
I.

When Proven, a Constructive Discharge is the
Legal Equivalent of an Actual Discharge, Which
Faragher/Ellerth Defined as a Tangible
Employment Action.

For decades, courts have recognized that a
constructive discharge-when proven-i s the
legal
equivalent of an actual di scharge. The Faragher/Ellerth
Court expressly cited actual di scharge as an example of a
Because di scharges fall
tangible empl oyment acti on.6
squarely within the tangibl e employment action category,
and because constructive discharge operates as th e legal
eq ui valent of ac tual di scharge, constructive di scharge
7
necessaril y constitutes a tangible empl oyment ac ti on. In
6

T he Courr prov ided a no n-exha ustive li st of exa mples of tangible
employment actio ns, whi c h included "hirin g, firin g, fai ling to promote.
reass ignment with s ignificantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a sig nificant c hange in benefits." Faragher, 524 U.S . at 790;
Ellerth, 524 U.S . at 76 1.
7
See Suders v. Easton. 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003); Jaros v. LodgeNer
Emm 'r Corp .. 294 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2002) (constructive discharge
co nsti tutes a tangible e mployment actio n); Durham Life In s. Co. v.
Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 144 (3 d C ir. 1999). The F irst and Seventh Circ uits
have held that a constructive di scharge caused by a supervi sor's "official
act" is a tangible e mpl oyme nt action. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc ..
333 F.3d 27, 33 ( 1st C ir. 2003) (constructive disc harge is a tangible
emp loy ment actio n if it is caused by a supervisor's "offic ial" ac t); accord
Robinson v. Sappington. 35 1 F.3d 3 17. 336 (7th Cir. 2003). A signi ficant
number of federa l di strict co urts have ruled that co nstructive di sc harge is
a ta ngibl e e mployme nt ac ti o n. Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window Co.
of A ri::.., In c., 2 18 F. S upp. 2d 11 39, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2002); Rousselle v.
GTE Direcrories C01p .. 85 F. S up p. 2d 1286, 1292 (M.D. F la. 2000);
Bevilacqua \'. Cubby Bea r, Ltd. , No. 98 C 7568, 2000 WL 1521 35, at *22
(N.D . Ill. Feb. 4, 2000); Cherry v. Menard. Inc. , 101 F. Supp . 2d 11 60
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Watso ll v. Lucenr Techs., 92 F. Supp. 2d 11 29. 11 35
(D Kan. 2000); Price v. Delaware Dep 'r of Co rrecrions. 40 F. S upp . 2d
544. 553 (D. Del. 1999); Limz v. Am. Gen Fin, Inc. , 50 F. Supp. 2d
1074 . I 084 rD . Kan . 1999); Galloway \'. Matagorda Counry, Tex., 35 F.
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liti gation , the Equal Employment Opp011unity Commi ssion
("EEOC"), th e federa l agency charged with enforcing Title
VII , has also taken the positi on that a constructi ve di sc harge
is a tangible employment action 8
EEOC interpretive
guidance iss ued after Faragher!Ellerth provides:
under
the
antiLi ab ilit y
standards
di scrimination statutes .. . generally make
empl oyers re spon sibl e for th e di scrimin atory
acts of their supervisors. If for examp le , a
supervisor rejects a candidate for promotjon
because of nationa l origin -based bias, the
e mpl oyer will be li ab le regardless of
Supp . 2d 952.957 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ; Leslie v. Unired Tech. Co rp .. 5 1 F.
Supp. 2d 1332. 1345-46 (S .D. Fla. 1998); Mill er v. D.F. Zee's, Inc., 31 F.
Supp. 2d 792, 803-04 (D . Or. 1998); Dela -:;aro v. Lehigh Uni v., No. 98CV432. 1999 U.S Di st. LEXIS 12 14. at *479 (E. D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999);
Jones , .. USA Perrol ettllt Co rp ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, J 383 (S .D . Ga.
J998). The Second and E leve nth C irc ui ts have held that co nstructi ve
di scharge is not a tangible emp loyment ac ti o n. and therefore. e mployers
may assert the Ellerrh!Faragher affirm ati ve defe nse. Ca ridad v. M erroNorc h Commwe r R.R ., 19 1 F. 3d 283. 294 (2d Cir. 1999) acco rd Reyn olds
v. Golden Co rral Corp .. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1243. 1249 (M.D Ala. 1999),
aff'd 2 13 F3d 1344 ! 11th Cir. 2000) (pe r cu riam ); see also Desm a rreau
, .. Ciry of Wichi ta, Kan .. 64 F. Supp . 2d 1067 , 1078 !D. Kan . 1999) ;
Dun egan ,., Ciry of Co un cil Grove. Kan. War er Dep 't. 77 F. S upp . 2d
11 92, 1200 (D. Kan. 1999) ; Scorr v. Am erirex Yarn , 72 F. Supp . 2d 587,
594 (O .S.C. 1999); Albener v. McDonald' s Co rp. , 70 F. Supp . 2d 11 38.
1147 !D Nev. 1999); Po well v. Mo rris. 37 F. Supp . 2d 1011. 10 19 !S.D.
O hi o 1999).
8
See Bri e f fo r EEOC at 3. EEOC v. Cro1vc/er Consnucrion Co., No.
3:00CV I86-V, 200 1 WL 1750843 (W .DNC. Oct. 26, 2001 )
!" IC]onstructi ve di sc harge constitutes a ta ngib le job ac tio n because it
results in a 'significant' change in e mpl oyment tatus."); accord Ame nded
Me morandum in Sup port o f EEOC's Oppositio n to Motio n for S ummary
Judgment at 15- 19, EEOC v. Barron ProtecTi ve Se rvices, Inc ., 47 F.
Supp . 2d 57 (D .D .C. 1999) !No. 98- 1536/JR) (" Defenda nt, while
recogni zing EEOC's allegati o n that '( the pl ai ntiff] was constructi vely
disc harged'
. obtuse ly maintains that she did not suffe r a 'tangible
. Not surprisingly. courts have recogni zed that
e mploy ment ac ti on' .
co nstructi ve d isc harge ca n be a tangible emp loyment ac ti o n.") .
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whether the employee complained to higher
management and regardless of whether
higher management had any knowledge
about
the
supervisor's
motivation.
Harassment
is
the
only
type
of
discrimination carried out by a supervi sor
for which an employer can avoid liability
and th at limitation must be construed
narrowl y.
EEOC Enforcement Guidance : Vicarious Employer
Responsibility for Unlawful Harass ment by Supervisors ,
Part (V)(B) (June 18 , 1999). Indeed, an employer should
not be able to avoid liability where an employee has no
reasonabl e option but to resign .
Courts and federal enforcement agencies have
consistent] y treated constructive di scharge as actual
di scharge. In fact , the doctrine developed preci sely for the
purpose of holding employers responsible for unlawful
conditi ons that force employees to resign.
The Supreme
Court first held that a constructive discharge function s as th e
legal equivalent of an actual di scharge in the case of SureTan, In c. v. NLRB , 467 U.S. 883 , 894 (1984)_9 In that
National Labor Relations Act case, the Court express ly
recognized the eq ui valence between directly di smi ssing an
employee and creating "working conditions so intolerable
that the emplo yee has no option but to resign -- a so-called
'constructive di scharge ."' !d. The Court' s Sure-Tan decision
continued a tradition under the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. 151 el seq. , of recognizing constructive di scharge
as the legal equivalent of actual di scharge. See Th e
9

See also Ruran v. Republican Parry of Illinois, 497 U .S. 62 , 68, 76
( 1990) (First Amendment pat ronage case recogni zing that constructi ve
di scharge is the "substantia l equivale nt of a dismi ssa l," expla ining that
"an empl oy ment deci sion is eq uivalent to a dismissal whe n it is o ne th at"
wo uld lead a reaso nable perso n to resign" ).
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Coachman's Inn , 147 NLRB 278, 303 (1964) ("
'[R] esignati on,' under press ure and scare . . . [must be]
treated fo r legal purposes the same as an actual di scharge . . .
.") ; In Matt er of Sterling Corset Co., 9 N .L.R .B. 858 (1938)
(first use of the term "constructive di scharge").
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S .C.
2000e et seq. , which was modeled on the NLRA , adopted th e
doctrine of con structive di scharge in whole cloth. See, e.g.,
11 0 CONG . REC. 3086, 7210-11 , 8453 (1964) (Titl e VII
was patterned after labor laws including NLRA); English v.
Powell 592 F.2d 727 , 73 1 n.4 (4th C ir. 1979) (ho lding
"doc trine of constructiv e di scharge 'had its genesis in th e
labor relations area but has been extended and held
app li cable to civil rights claims' "). Today , con structive
di scharge is universall y recogni zed to provide redress to
empl oyees who are forced out of employment through
di scrimin atory means. 1
Consistent with thi s uni versall y
accepted principle , the EEOC explain s that an employer "i s
responsibl e for a constructive di scharge in the same manner
that it is responsibl e for the outri ght di scriminatory discharge
EEOC Interpretive Manual , §
o f a chargi ng party."
6 12.9(a). 11

°

°

1

Firz v. Pugmire Lincoln -Mercury. Inc., 348 F. 3d 974, 977 ( 11th Cir.
2003); Goldmeier v. Allstate In s. Co., 337 F.3d 629. 635 (6th Ci r. 2003 );
EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps , 276 F. 3d 326, 33 1 (7 th C ir. 2002);
Fi1 zgera/d v. Henderson , 25 1 F.3d 345, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2001); Jo rdan v.
Clark, 847 F.2d 1368. 1377 n.l O (9th C ir. 1988); She ridan v. E. !. DuPo111
de Ne morm & Co ., 100 F.3d 106 1, 1075 (3d C ir. 1996); Vega v. Kodak
Ca ribb ean. Ltd., 3 F.3d 476 (1st C ir. 1993); Landg raf v. US/ Film
Prods., 968 F.2d 427 ,430 (5 th Cir. 1992 ); Parolin e v. Unisys C01p. , 900
F.2d 27 (4 th Cir. 1990); Wwson v. Natio nwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360
(9th Ci r. 1987) ; Derr v. Gulf Oil Co rp., 796 F.2d 340 ClOth Cir. 1986) ;
John son v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 198 1); see also A.
Larson & L. Larson, EMPLOYMENT D ISCR IMINATION, § 87 .20 at 17-102
to 17- 105 ( 1987 ).
11
Indeed, contrary to the heav il y co nditi oned positio n articu lated in the
So lic itor Ge neral's bri ef, to whi c h the EEOC is a s ignato ry, the EEOC
has take n the straightforward positi o n in its liti gation that a constructi ve
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Appropriately, in Suders, the Third Circuit
recogni zed th at a constructi ve discharge is the equi valent of
an ac tu al di scharge:
[It is a] fundamental principle of our
jurisprudence that a constructive di scharge,
when proved, operates as the fun cti onal
equi valent of an ac tual termination. Thi s
p1incipl e recogni zes th at when a pl aintiffemp loyee successfully demonstrates that th e
work environment created by an employer
was so intol erable th at he or she had no
choice but to resign, the constructi ve
di sc harge becomes, for all intents and
purposes, the ac t of th e e mplo yer.

Suders, 325 F. 3d at 458 (c itations omitted) .12
di scharge is necessaril y a tangibl e e mployme nt actio n and categori zed
the arg uments to the contrary as "obtuse. " See supra note 8.
12
See also, e.g. , Fitz v. Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, In c., 348 F.3d 974,
977 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("[C]onstructive disc harge occurs whe n a
di criminatory e mployer imposes working conditions that are 'so
into lerable that a reasonab le person in [the employee's] positi on would
have bee n compelled to resign.' "); Manau v. Bank of A m., NA, 339 F. 3d
792, 803 (9th C ir . 2003) (construc ti ve d ischarge requires "conditions so
into lerab le that a reasonable person wo uld leave the j ob"); Goldm eier v.
A llsrare In s. Co. , 337 F.3 d 629 , 635 (6th Cir. 2003) (empl oyer must
create intolerabl e wo rking conditio ns that wo uld force a reasonable
person to res ign); Suarez v. Pu eblo Inr'l, In c., 229 F. 3d 49, 54 ( 1st C ir .
2000) (finding constructive di sc harge where "the working conditio ns
imposed by the e mpl oyer had become so o nero us, abusive, or unpleasant
tha t a reasona ble perso n in the e mployee ·s positi o n wo uld have fe lt
compelled to res ign" ); Kirsch v. Fleer Srreer, Lrd., 148 F.3d 149 (2d C ir.
1998) (working conditions must be so intolerable that e mployee is forced
into invo luntary res ignation); Brown v. Amerirech C01p., 128 F.3d 605
{7 th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim of co nstructi ve discharge on the gro unds
that employee coul d have remai ned and the supervisor's comment was
insufficie ntl y fo rceful or coercive); Landg raf v. US! Film Prods., 968
F.2d 427. 430 (5 th Cir. I 992) (find ing constructi ve di sc harge where the
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In contrast to a constructive discharge claim, a hostile
work environment claim does not require proof of conditions
that would force a reasonabl e person to resign. Instead, a
c laim of environmental harassment requires proof of
di scri minatory behavior that ts sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of a victim's employment
and to create an abusive working environment. Meriwr
Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 , 67. The Supreme Court has
c larified that the hostile work environment "standard takes a
middle path between making actionable any conduct that is
merely offensive and req uirin g the conduct to cause a
tangible psyc hological injury . .. . Title VII comes into play
before the harassin g conduct leads to a nervous breakdown."
Harris v. Forklift Sys., In c., 510 U.S. 17 , 21-22 (1993) . The
doctrine of constructi ve di sc harge applies in the most
egregious cases in whi ch the employee is force d to resign
because th e work environment has become patently
intolerable, and a reasonable person would conclude that he
or she has no real option but to resign. 13
plaintiff de monstrates "a greater seve rit y or pervasiveness of harass ment
than the minimum req uired to prove a hostile work in g environment" );
Amimwkri v. Balrimore Gas & Elec. Co .. 60 F.3d 1126. 11 32 (4th C ir.
1995) (co nstructi ve di sc harge requires proof that emp loyer de liberate ly
made working conditi o ns intolerable in an effort to induce the e mployee
to quit); Wesr v. Marion Merrell Dow, In c., 54 F. 3d 49 3. 497 (8th C ir.
1995) ("An e mployee is co nstructi vely di sc harged whe n an employer
de libe rate ly renders the emp loyee's wo rking conditi o ns into lerabl e and
thus fo rces [her] to quit [her] j ob."); Clark r. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168
m.c. C ir . 198 1) (e mployee must estab li sh that the emp loyer
"deliberate ly made
workin g conditi o ns inte lora ble and drove [the
e mpl oyee] into an 'invo luntary quit.'" ; Carrwright Hard ware Co ., In c. 1'.
NLRB , 600 F. 2d 268 ( lOth Cir. 1979) (rej ecting claim o f constructi ve
di scharge because record did not establish th at the emp loyees resigned
because emp loyer had created "impossible" conditions) .
13
Thi s in no way s uggests that the degree o f harass ment is the defining
fa c to r in a construc ti ve discharge case. The standard fo r constructive
discharge is that the employee is fo rced to resign beca use the work
e nvi ro nment ha s become so intolerable. and a reasonabl e person wo uld
co nc lud e that they have no rea l opti o n but to res ign. See supra no te 12.
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If Suders prevail s on her cl aim of constructive
discharge , that discharge constitutes a tangible employment
action for which the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is
unavailable.
Although Suders has not yet had the
opportunity to present her claim of constructive discharge to
a fact-finder, the Third Circuit suggests that her employment
situati on had reached a breaking point. Suders, 325 F.3d at
438 ("Suders reached a breaking point .... Any prospect of
reconciliation was now lost. ").
At thi s point in th e
proceedings, we must take as true Suders' allegations th at the
hostile environment, combined with the lack of recourse,
fo rced her resignation . If these facts are accepted by the
fact -finder , Suders will prevail on her claim of constructive
di scharge .
If a fact-finder concludes that a constructive
di scharge occurred, thi s case cannot be characterized as
Petitioner suggests-as a "mere" hostile work environment
to whi ch Suders respon ded by choosi ng to quit. Brief for
Petitioner at 12 . In a constructive di scharge case, the
emp lo yee does not "choose " to resign. Instead, workplace
conditi ons leave the employee with no option but to leave.
B y definition , such a constructive di scharge is the act of the
employer, not of the terminated worker. Because a
constructive di scharge is the legal equi valent of an actual
di scharge, a constructive di scharge constitutes a tangible
empl oyment action .

II.

When Proven , Constructive Discharge Addresses
the Core Policy Considerations Underlying the
Faragher!Ellerth Defense, and Permitting the
Defense in a Constructive Discharge Situation
Makes No Sense.

The Supreme Court's purpose in allowi ng th e
Faragher!Ellerth defense is accompli shed at the outset if the
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plaintiff proves the elements of a constructive discharge. If
employment circumstances are so onerous, abusive, or
unpleasant that a reaso nable person in the employee's
14
position is compel led to resign , then it wi ll be impossible
for the employer to prove that the employee acted
unreasonably under the Faragher/Ellerth defense . Proof of
a constructive di scharge and proof of the Faragher/Ellerth
defense are mu tually exc lusive and cannot be established on
the same factu al base.
The Faragher/Ellerth defense all ows an employer to
avoid liability when th e emp loyer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and promptl y correct any sexually harassing
behavior, and th e plaintiff-employee unreasonably fai led to
take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportuniti es pro vided by th e employe r. Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 807. Before a jury wou ld reach the question of whether
th e employee acted unreasonab ly under the affi1mative
defense, however, th e jury would have first had to find a
constructive di scharge- i. e., that working conditions were so
difficu lt or unpl easa nt that a reasonab le person in the
employee's shoes wo uld have fe lt compelled to resign. See
supra note 12. These two findin gs cannot exist in tandem.
The employer cannot prove the second prong of the
the
employee
acted
affirmative
defense-that
unreasonab ly- if the plaintiff proves at the outset that she
acted reasonably pursuant to her constructive di scharge
c laim.
A plaintiff alleging a constructive di sc harge in
violation of Tit le VII must establi sh that he or she suffe red
harass ment or di scrimination so intolerab le that a reasonab le
person in the same position wou ld have felt compelled to
resign, given th e totality of the circumstances. See supra
note 12. In every juri sdi ction , a claim of constructive
14

See supra no te 1:2.
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di sc harge requires proof that the employee reasonab ly
believed that she had no recourse but to resign . !d. As the
Third Circuit observed in thi s case , "it is relevant whether the
employee explored alternative avenues to resolve the all eged
discrimin ation before resigning, [but] a failure to do so will
not defeat a claim of constructive discharge where the
working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable
person wou ld have co ncluded that there was no oth er choice
15
but to resign ."
Suders , 325 F.3d at 445-46 (emph as is
added). In sum , if th ere is an avenue short of resignation
reasonably availab le to the employee to remedy th e
situation , and she fail s to pursue that avenue, her fai lure wi ll
defeat the constructive di sc harge claim .
Petitioner
and
the
Solicitor Ge neral have
acknowledged the overlap between elements of con structive
di sc harge and of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Brief for
Petitioner at 11: Brief for Soli citor General at 17- 18. The
Soli citor General admits th at "[i]f an empl oyer makes the
showing necessary to establi sh the Ellerrh/Faragher
affirmative defense, it is difficult to understand how an
e mpl oyee would be able to es tabli sh a constructive di scharge
in the first pl ace ." Bri ef for Solicitor General at 17- 18.
Altho ug h the briefs of the Petitioner and its amici admi t thi s
overlap , they fail to address its ramifications. The Solicitor
General 's brief suggests th at th e instant "case does not raise
th e qu estion of the precise relation ship between the stand ard
fo r
pro vmg
a
constructive
di scharge
and
th e
15

The C hamber of Co mmerce argues that harass ment victims will
de liberate ly deprive empl oyers of info rm at ion about harass ment so that
victims ca n bring co nstructi ve di scharge cases and cut off any affirm ative
de fe nse s by qui uin g rath er than notify in g the employer, who co uld the n
correc t the harass ment. Thi s argume nt ignores the fac t that the plaintiff
who man ipulates the system in thi s wa y would not be able to meet the
"re asonableness " tes t req uired to pro ve a constructive di scharge . It al so
igno res th e fac ts that res ig ning fro m a j ob is not easy fo r an empl oyee
w ho is dependent on a sa lary. and th at bringing a harass ment case is a
stress ful. ex pensive un derta king.
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Ellerth/Faragher affirm ative defense ."
/d.
On the
contrary, thi s case raises precisely that iss ue. T hi s case
cann ot be decided without accounting for the mutual
exclusivity of th e doctri nes of constructi ve dj scharge and the
Faraghe r/Ellerth affirm ati ve defense . The Court should
address thi s concern and pro vide a coherent doctrin e to guide
th e lower co urts, recogni zing that a constructi ve di scharge
occ urs when in to lerable employmen t circumstances leave an
employee wi th no option but to resign. When a constructi ve
di scharge occ urs, th e affirm ati ve defense has no appli cati on.

III.

Constructive Discharge Exhibits the Attributes of
a Tangible Employment Action

In Fa ragher/Elle rth , th e C ourt noted attributes
typi cal of tan gible empl oyment ac tions. Generall y, the Court
ex plaj ned th at a tangible e mployment ac tion may
fundamental! y change th e worker's status at the firm , impose
direct fin ancial harm , and co nstitute an o ffi cia l compan y
ac t. 17 Under the Court's reasoning, th ese attributes veri fy
18
The
th at the ac ti on is aided by th e agen cy relati onship .
16

B y its own admi ss io n. the Solic itor Ge neral's pro posed analys is could
onl y app ly to a narrow e t o f c irc umstances where the evidence
sup po rting the constructive d ischarge does no t overl ap with the
affirmati ve defe nse . Brie f for Soli c ito r Ge ne ra l at 17- 18.
17
T hese are examples of the attr ibutes o f a tangib le e mpl oyme nt ac ti o n.
rather th a n an exc lus ive or manda tory list. The to ta li ty o f fac ts must be
examined in each harass ment case. M eriro r Sa vings Ba nk. FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U .S . 57, 69 ( 19 86); see also Holly D. v. Ca. fnsr. of Tech ..
339 F.3 d 11 58 (9 th C ir . 200 3) (sub mi ssio n to sex ual abuse b y a
supervisor co nstitutes a tangible employme nt ac tio n); l in v. M erro. Life
In s Co., 3 10 F.3d 84 (2d C ir. 2002) (same) .
18
In Fa ragher, the Court recogni zed :
[T]here is a se nse in whic h a harass ing supervisor is
a lways ass isted in his mi scond uct by the s upervisory
re latio nshi p
W he n a person with superv isory
a ut hority d iscrim inates in the terms a nd cond itio ns o f
subo rd inates ' e mployment, hi s ac tio ns necessaril y
d raw upon his supe ri o r pos iti o n o ver the peo ple who
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Court discussed these attributes m general terms and used
qualifying language:
A tangible emp loyment action in most cases
inflicts direct economic harm . As a general
proposition, only a supervisor, or other
person acting with the authority of the
company can cause this sort of injury .... A
tangible employment decision . . . in most
cases is documented in official company
records . .. .

Ellenh, 524 U.S. at 761-62 (emphasis added). Clearly the
Court intended to provide a flexible framework of general
guidance. The Cour1 did not suggest that each of these
attributes would apply to every tangible employment action.
Nevertheless, a constructive discharge possesses each of the
attributes characte ri sti c of the tangible employment action ,
as described in Faragher/Ellerth.
Ellerth characterized a "tangible employment action"
as "a significant change in employment status .... " Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 761. In its effect on the worker's employment
status, a constructive discharge is unassai labl y a discharge
with identical chan ges in employment status. "[C]onstructive
report to him , o r those under them, whereas an
empl oyee ge nerall y cannot check a supervisor"s
abusive conduct the sa me way that she mi ght deal
with ab use fr o m a coworker.
Fara gher. 524 U.S . at 802-03. Accordin gly, an e mployer can be li ab le
for the act io ns o f a supervisor, even when the supervi sor acts o utside o f
ex press ly and affirmatively de legated authority. Fara gher at 80 5; see
also Susan G rover. After E llerth: Th e Tangible Employment Action in
Sexual Hara ssmem Analysis. 35 U. MICH. J.L. R EFORM 809 , 839 (2002)
("The key. then , is ... the source o f the power the supervisor uses to take
that ac tion. If that power is derived from the authorit y the supervi sor
derives fro m hi s relationship with the emplo yer, the ac ti on taken is a
[tangible employme nt actio n). regardless of whether it alters the
subordinate 's status in an ultimate sense." ).
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di sc harge constitutes prec isely the same sort of 'significant
change in employment status' and inflicts prec isely the same
sort of 'economi c harm' as any other 'firing .' " Cherry v.
M enard, In c., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (N .D . Iowa 2000);
see also Vasque z v. Atrium Door & Window Co. of Ariz.,
In c ., 218 F. Supp. 2d 11 39, 1142-43 (D. Ariz. 2002) .
Petitioner actuall y agrees that co nstructive discharge
"effects a signifi cant c hange in empl oyment status, " but
would di scount that c hange by claimin g th at the change is "a
res ult of the empl oyee ' s ow n dec ision." Bri ef for Petitioner
at 21. Thi s argument has two shortcomin gs. For one , the
c hange in employment status results regardl ess of whether
the di scharge is ac tu al or co nstru ctive. Th e "significant
c hange in e mpl oyment status" cri terio n of Faragher/Ellerrh
assesses the results of the act, not the ca usative act itself.
More importantly, Petitioner's characteii zati on of the
underlying act is inacc urate ; the causative act is not that of
the employee, but of th e empl oyer, throu gh th e ac tions of its
supervi sors co mbined with the un avai lab ili ty of internal
remedi es to rectify the situation. B y definiti on. con structive
di scharge does not involve a true choice on th e pan o f the
e mployee .
When a constructi ve di scharge occurs, th e
responsible actor is the e mplo yer, not the emp loyee . The
discharge is forced on the emp loyee by th e employer's
ac ti ons- the e mpl oyee has no choice but to resign. As a
matter o f law , a constructive discharge is ide nti cal to an
actual di scharge in its effect on the empl oyee's empl oyment
status.
The Co urt also pro vided that a "tangibl e empl oyment
action in most cases infli cts direc t economi c harm ." Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 762 . Like any oth er type of discharge,
constructive di scharge falls squarely w ithin the category of
e mpl oyment actio ns that cause economic harm . As the Third
Ci rc uit recogni zed in thi s case, "when a plaintiff-empl oyee
meets th e strin gent test of s howing a co nstructive di scharge,
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the direct economic harm suffered is identical to that of a
formally di scharged employee." Suders, 325 F.3d at 45 8.
Because direct economic harm res ults regardless of whether
th e di scharge is actual or constructive , Ellerth's definition
renders constructive disc harge a tangible employment action.
The Court also advi sed that a tangible employment
action in most cases involves an "official company act."
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. Where intolerable work conditions
force an employee to resign , that constructive di scharge is
treated as an act of the employer, just as an actual di scharge
would be. The official nature of the di scharge is reinforced
by th e employer's receipt, acceptance, processing and
recordin g of the emplo yee's letter or other notice of
resignabon .
As found by the court below , "when a
superv isor creates a hostile work environment so severe th at
an empl oyee has no alternative but to resign , the official
power of the enterprise is brought to bear on the constructive
di scharge. " Sude rs, 325 F.3d at 459 . The official action is
allowing the workplace to become so hostile and so
unresponsive to the empl oyee's injuries that the harassed
emplo yee reasonabl y beli eves th at immediate resignation is
her on! y choice. For decades, the law has recogni zed th at a
constructi ve discharge is an official company act for which
th e employer must be liable. See supra argument I. Under
the doctrine of constructive discharge, the official ac t is the
creation of workplace conditions so intolerable th at the
harassed employee has no choice but to resign.
Because a constructive discharge constitutes an
offici al act in and of itself, the Court must reject the Solicitor
General's argument th at a constructi ve di scharge constitutes
a tangible employment action onl y if it is effected through an
intermediate "official ac t." Brief for Solicitor General at 8.
Moreover, the di stinction between official and un official acts
suggested by the Solicitor General ignores the reality of th e
workpl ace. The Court has recogni zed th at "a supervisor's
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power and authority invests hi s or her harassing conduct with
a particular threatenin g charac ter, and in thi s sense, a
supervisor always is aided by the agency relation ." Ellerth ,
524 U.S . at 763. Where, as here, a supervisor's actions
culminate in a di sc harge, the Co urt recognized in Ellerth that
those actions are aided by the agency relation . Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 761.
Additionall y, th e Court ex plained that an official
company act "in most cases is documented in official
company records, and may be subject to review by hi gher
level supervi sors." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 . Indeed, a
constructive di sc harge invol ves a forced resignation that will
be documented in company records and subject to revi ew by
hi gher level supervi sors. T he co mpan y must take official
actions to ensure that th e person is no longer on the payroll.
The Th ird C ircuit recognized that "a constructive discharge
will necessarily in volve the termin ation of an employment
relation ship , [therefore] the empl oyer wi ll be on notice and
have the opportunity to determine the cause of separation
from employment." Suders. 325 F. 3d at 460. The added
element of a forced res ignation distinguishes constructive
di sc harge from a hos til e environment, where there is no
official company act.
In summary, Faragher/Ellerth created an exception
to the general rul e of empl oyer li ability. Thi s exception
app li es on ly to claims of hostile work environment. Th e
exception does not ap pl y to tan gible e mplo yment action s,
such as th e constru ctiv e di sc harge that occurred in thi s case.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the amici respectfull y suggest
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that the Third Circuit's holding that constructive discharge
constitutes a tangible employment action, and therefore, the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defen se does not apply , should
be
AFFIRMED.
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